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Abstract 
We investigate whether there are differences in characteristics and performance of mutual funds caused 
by the manager’s gender. Through examining a large sample of U.S. domestic equity mutual fund, we 
find some evidence that suggests female managers have a lower risk tolerance than males. This leads to 
the observation that females tend to hold a higher total number of assets (stocks) and fewer assets in 
their top 10 holdings than do male managers. We then analyze performance within funds over time in 
order to evaluate the impact of changes in management’s gender composition on funds’ performance. 
We find some evidence that the percentage of female managers managing a fund is negatively related to 
the fund’s performance over time.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
With recent advances in the understanding the psychology of investing, it is now 
commonly understood that different groups of investors have varying characteristics. Some 
systematic differences between male and female investors have been documented. These include 
that women tend not to have as much confidence as male investors, and women are generally 
more risk averse than men1. As a popular investment vehicle, mutual funds have grown 
tremendously over the past few decades. If these behavioral phenomena found in individual 
investors also prevail among mutual fund managers, there are many potential ramifications for 
investors. For example, if women managers are more risk averse, we should see women 
managing more conservative funds, such as value funds. In combination with being conservative, 
if women managers are less confident with their stock picks, they should have a lower turnover 
in their portfolios because they would be more cautious about moving money into a new 
security. As a result, female managers’ transaction fees would be lower. 
The combination of more conservative stock picks and lower turnover may imply either 
higher or lower returns depending upon which trait dominates. According to modern portfolio 
theory, taking greater investment risk should result in receiving a greater reward, so investing in 
less risky assets would lead to lower returns. This implies that men may have better performance 
in their investments since they are less risk averse than women. However, numerous empirical 
studies (Lakonishok et al. (1994), La Porta et al. (1997), Lee and Swaminathan (2000) and 
Barberis and Shleifer (2003)) find that value stocks outperform growth stocks in the long run2. If 
females tend to invest in value-oriented stocks, then their long-term performances should be 
                                                 
1 A few references regarding gender differences include Barber and Odean (2001), Estes and Hosseini (1988), 
Bajtelsmit and VanDerhei (1997) 
2 However, Chan et al. (2002) find evidence that growth managers outperform value managers after adjusting for 
style. 
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greater than males. Not to be forgotten, lower turnover implies lower transactions costs, and 
therefore higher returns on the portfolio (Barber and Odean (2001, 2000)). So, if female 
managers express both the lack of confidence trait and a tendency toward conservative investing, 
women should make higher nominal returns than men. 
There are a few reasons to believe that mutual fund managers, in general, behave 
differently than average individual investors. First, fund managers’ investment choices are often 
constrained by limits set forth in the fund prospectus. With some exceptions, such as sector 
funds, prospectuses typically have diversification requirements that do not allow fund managers 
to invest large portions of the funds in individual stocks, sectors, or other high-risk investments. 
Second, education makes a difference. Almost all fund managers have college degrees, whereas 
only 28% of adults in the United States had attained bachelor’s degrees.3 Additionally, more than 
50% of mutual fund managers hold MBAs and more than 35% hold CFAs (Atkinson et al. 
(2003) and Chevalier and Ellison (1999)). Third, female mutual fund managers have chosen a 
career path in portfolio management, a male-dominating field. Not like average individual 
female investors who may not willingly participate in trading activities, female fund managers 
have the knowledge and expertise in investment and managing risk and may be more confident 
and competitive in order to establish themselves in the field. Because of these reasons, 
investment behaviors of male and female fund managers may not be as different as might be 
observed in the general investing public. 
It is important to investigate the gender issue in mutual fund management, because if 
gender does matter then it should be a factor for investors to consider when choosing funds. So 
far, a few gender studies have been conducted on mutual funds. However, the results have not 
been consistent: some researchers find that female fund managers are more risk averse, trade less 
                                                 
3 U.S. Department of Education (2005) 
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and shy away from competition (Beckmann and Menkhoff (2008)) while others do not identify 
any significant gender differences (Atkinson, et al (2003). This implies that further examination 
on the issue is necessary. Our study is an extension of the existing ones. First, our sample 
includes over two thousand fund managers among which over 10% are female and covers the 
time period From March 1984 to February 2004. It is among the most recent and includes the 
largest sample in the similar studies. Atkinson, et al (2003) include only 72 female fund 
managers (5.6% of the overall sample), and Beckmann and Menkhoff (2008) only have total 148 
U.S. fund managers participating their survey. We also match a male manager to each female 
manager using three different criteria including one with a control for self-selection bias. Using 
these various filters allows us to be more focused and better identify the gender differences, if 
any exist. Second, we examine changes in gender compositions of fund management and 
investigate whether the change in composition has a significant impact on the mutual fund 
performance. To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first such investigation of this issue.  
Specifically, we focus on U.S. domestic stock mutual fund managers and assess the 
gender differences in performance and investment behaviors. Our sample includes 2,217 fund 
managers of which 223 are female managers.   Our empirical results suggest that female mutual 
fund managers have a lower risk tolerance (standard deviation) than male managers and they 
spread their risk out over more stocks and hold a lower percentage of assets in their top 10 
holdings. Compared to male managers, females tend to manage no-load funds in the value 
category. We also find that the gender difference is not a source of abnormal returns. 
When we examine performance within funds over time, we identify the relationship 
between  changes in the gender composition of a fund’s management and its performance. There 
is strong evidence that a fund experiences better returns when there is a major change in the 
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gender composition of its management. There is weak evidence that although both increasing 
and decreasing the percentage of female managers will result in better future returns in the fund, 
a larger increase in performance is usually associated with a major decrease in the percentage of 
its female management. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section covers previous literature 
relevant to the ideas presented in this paper. The third section gives a description of the data and 
data sources. We present our hypotheses and models in the fourth section. Section V. enumerates 
the empirical results, and the last section summarizes and concludes. 
 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 Our review begins with the existing research which focuses on the differences between 
males and females in the general public making financial decisions. Using a psychology survey 
experiment conducted among shareholders, security analysts, institutional investors and general 
business persons, Estes and Hosseini (1988) find that women have considerably less confidence 
than men when it comes to investment decisions.  Through a behavioral finance experiment run 
among undergraduate and graduate business students, Powell and Ansic (1997) also find that 
females were less confident in their predictions than males with a similar level of prior 
experience and education. Sundén and Surette (1998) use the Survey of Consumer Finance 
sponsored by the Federal Reserve Board to study defined contribution retirement plans. They 
observe that gender and marital status significantly affect allocation decisions, i.e., women, 
especially married women, tend to allocate their investments more conservatively than men. 
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Single men tend to choose mostly stocks in their portfolios while married women choose mostly 
bonds.4  
In contrast, Schubert et al. (1999) believe that survey data may not be a reliable source to 
identify the gender difference in risk-taking behavior and previous studies that amplify gender 
stereotyping may be erroneous. Rather, they conduct an experiment that brings out the risk 
tendencies of each gender in financial situations. 5 They find that men and women’s risk-taking 
behavior depends significantly on the financial decision setting. In a controlled setting, they find 
that even though women exhibit more risk-aversion to losses in abstract gambles, there are no 
differences in risk-taking behavior between gender when facing investment and insurance-related 
decisions. While all the literature provides useful insights upon the gender issue, Powell and 
Ansic and Schubert et al. used students as their primary subject for their surveys and 
experiments. Due to the captive nature and the age and education level of their subjects plus the 
relatively small sample sizes, their results may be more difficult to extrapolate to the general 
public.  
Using account data from a large brokerage firm, Barber and Odean (2001) find that men 
trade 45 percent more than women, which leads to a greater annual reduction in their net returns. 
They attribute the performance and trading activity of men to overconfidence in their investment 
abilities. 
The second half of the review focuses on literature that deals more directly with manager-
specific characteristics that may influence mutual fund returns. Golec (1996) analyzes whether 
non-gender manager characteristics explain fund performance, risk and fees. He examines 530 
                                                 
4 Bajtelsmit and VanDerhei (1997), Hinz, McCarthy, and Turner (1997) and Jianakoplos and Bernasek (1998) have 
also used surveys and other economic data and similarly discover that women invest more conservatively than men. 
5 The instructions and procedures for the experiment conducted in Schubert et al. (1999) may be found (in English) 
at http://www.wif.ethz.ch/gruppe_schubert/people/srenate/srenate/papers/aea99 
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mutual funds over the time period of 1988 to 1990. The manager characteristics being 
investigated include age, tenure with the fund, years of education, whether or not the manager 
has an MBA degree, management team size, fund age, fund assets, load charge, and fund 
objective. He reveals that manager age, tenure and education are important factors in 
determining a fund’s performance, risk and fees.6 Chevalier and Ellison (1999) conduct a similar 
study over a time frame of 1988 to 1995 during which stocks were in the midst of a significant 
bull market in the United States. They examine the characteristics of fund managers such as age, 
the average composite SAT score at the manager’s undergraduate institution, and whether the 
manager has an MBA. Although they find that only the undergraduate college attended by the 
manager turns out to be relevant, this finding may be due to the sample that they used. Some of 
their data was back-filled. Other data they used was manually entered based on assumptions 
about the manager’s age when graduating college or about the schools attended by these 
managers. These assumptions may introduce biases that lead the authors to incorrect conclusions.  
Atkinson, Baird, and Frye (2003) fully analyze the gender issue in mutual fund 
managementThey look at fixed-income mutual fund managers and compare male and female 
managers to see if there is a difference in performance, risk, or other characteristics. According 
to their results, there are no significant gender differences in mutual fund management. This 
suggests to them that differences found in the literature may be attributed to investor knowledge 
and wealth constraints. However, they do find that the manager’s gender influences the 
investors’ decision on whether to invest in a fund. Female fund managers receive lower fund 
inflows in the first year managing a particular fund. 
                                                 
6 Gottesman and Morey (2006) emphasize the significance of manager education as an important determinant in 
fund performance. They find that mutual fund managers that received MBAs from a top school achieved 
significantly greater performance than other managers. 
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Beckmann and Menkhoff (2008) conduct a survey among 649 fund managers in US, 
Germany, Thailand, and Italy. There are 148 response from US in which 11.4% is female. While 
examining the risk behavior in U.S, they find that female professionals are more risk averse that 
the males. They find no evidence of gender difference in overconfidence. 
 
III. DATA 
All data were obtained from the Morningstar Principia Advanced Mutual Funds Module 
dated February 29, 2004. From this CD, the following variables were obtained: monthly returns, 
net assets, expense ratio, standard deviation, total number of holdings, percentage of assets in top 
10 holdings, P/E ratio, turnover, the starting date for the current management, and whether the 
fund was a no-load fund or not.  
The CD includes total 9,327 U.S. domestic stock mutual funds. The following criteria are 
used to select the funds for this paper: (1)  Funds that are closed to new investment, “Bear 
Market” and “Convertible Bond” funds are eliminated because their performance characteristics 
are different from other types of mutual funds . (2) Exchange-traded funds (ETFs), unmanaged, 
and team-managed funds are eliminated because there is no discernable manager. (3) To assure 
enough of a performance track record for the monthly analysis, a minimum three-year 
performance measure is required.7 (4) When multiple classes exist for the same fund, the class 
with the longest history is selected (Carhart (1997)).8 If two or more classes have identical 
inception dates, the one with larger net assets is selected. The filtered sample has 2,217 total 
funds of which 233 are primarily managed by women (10.51%). Where there is missing data, the 
                                                 
7 The three-year time frame is the same that Morningstar uses to provide their first “Morningstar Rating.” 
8 The classes represent a common pool of assets but differ in term of how distribution-related fees are paid. 
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most recent fund report (prospectus, annual, and/or semi-annual reports) was used to correct this 
deficiency.  
Manager information is also available on the disk including the names of all current and 
prior fund managers and a short biography of most current managers. Out of the 2,217 fund 
managers selected, only 909 of them (41.0%) have education background information available 
on the Morningstar CD. We find that the availability of the education-related material was 
largely dependent upon the fund family to which the mutual fund belonged. It appears that many 
of the larger fund families do report managers’ education data (such as Fidelity and Vanguard) 
and many smaller families do not. We would expect the education statistics to be biased toward 
higher education than the industry average because presumably the larger groups have the ability 
to select top candidates at premium salaries. Therefore, we choose not to introduce education 
variables into our paper. 
Among the filtered sample of 2,217 funds, two categories of sub-samples are created. In 
the first categories, each of 233 female managers are matched to a male counterpart based upon 
size and tenure, standard deviation (risk) and tenure, and the percent of assets in the top 10 
holdings and tenure with their closest male counterparts. The size-tenure matched sample 
attempts to alleviate bias based on diseconomies of scale and manager experience. This matching 
is similar to Atkinson, et al. (2003). The standard-deviation-tenure matched sample attempts to 
alleviate a potential self-selection bias as well as control for manager experience. The self-
selection bias occurs because mutual fund managers self-select to highly competitive and risky 
field. They may be less risk-averse in nature compared to the rest of general population 
regardless of gender. We attempt to assure a comparable level of risk aversion among paired 
sample by using the standard deviation. The asset-holding-tenure matched sample is created in 
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order to control for a potential bias in asset concentration between the matched sample and the 
full sample of male domestic equity fund managers. In short, each matched sub-sample consists 
of the 233 female managers and their 233 male counterparts. 
In the second category of sub-samples, we select funds that had (since March 1984) a 
major change in management gender composition, either from female to male or male to female. 
A major change is defined as a gender change of at least 50% of the management composition of 
a fund at a specific time. For example, a fund managed by one male manager (100% male and 
0% female) changes to one female manager (0% male and 100% female). Or a fund managed by 
three female managers (100% female and 0% male) switches to one female manger and two 
males (33% female and 67% male). Additionally, the same management composition must 
remain in control of the fund for at least 12 months both before and after the changing date. As a 
result, the changing composition sub-sample includes 102 funds with a total of 150 gender 
composition changes (90 are male to female changes and the remainder are female to male 
changes). 
 
IV. HYPOTHESES AND MODELS 
Hypothesis one: within styles of mutual funds, fund characteristics do not vary due to fund 
managers’ gender. 
The majority of academic research agrees that, in general, men and women have 
systematic behavioral differences in the way that they invest: women tend to be more risk averse 
than men. Beckmann and Menkhoff (2008) observe the same risk aversion different between 
genders in fund managers using a survey data. Unfortunately, their sample size is rather small. 
Additionally, Schubert et al. (1999) point out that conclusions drawn from a survey may be 
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erroneous since survey data lack adequate controls for individual risk-taking behavior. Using 
non-survey data, Atkinson, et al. (2003) are unable to find a significant difference in 
performance between male and female domestic fixed-income mutual fund managers It is 
reasonable to believe that given their superior training and knowledge of investments relative to 
the general public, it is likely that performance differences between male and female fund 
managers are insignificant. Therefore, we expect that there are no differences in fund 
characteristics between genders. 
To test this hypothesis, paired t-tests that compare the means of female and male managers are 
performed on the following well-known fund characteristics using the three matched sub-
samples: expense ratio, standard deviation (proxy for risk), number of holdings (proxy for 
diversification), percentage of assets in top 10 holdings (proxy for concentration and 
diversification), P/E ratio (proxy for value), turnover defined by purchases or sales (whichever is 
less) divided by the average monthly net assets, whether the fund was a no-load fund or not, net 
assets (fund size) and manager’s tenure (to control for experience). If the results of paired t-tests 
are insignificant, hypothesis one holds, i.e., there are no gender differences in fund 
characteristics. If the t-test results are significant, the hypothesis is rejected. This means that 
mutual fund managers invest differently due to gender. Compared to their male counterparts, 
female managers more likely have lower turnover (due to less overconfidence) and invest more 
in conservative stocks (due to more risk aversion), which leads to higher long-term returns. 
 
Hypothesis Two: Returns vary in a systematic way due to fund managers’ gender. 
We expect that the similarities in the education and experience of fund managers will 
outweigh the differences in gender, which means that there should not be significant differences 
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in fund performance due to gender. However, if data tell us otherwise, it will inform investors 
how to increase returns based upon the gender characteristics of mutual fund management. 
Further, it will inform the mutual funds, themselves, how to adjust their management gender 
compositions to increase performance.  
A one-index model and two multi-factor models are applied to examine the performance 
of the male- and female-managed mutual funds. Specifically, 
                                                                                                (1) 
                                                           (2) 
                                       (3) 
where  is the excess return on the pth fund during month t, is the abnormal excess return 
on the portfolio, is the standard market-model risk measure,  is the excess return on a 
market index, , , and are the sensitivities of the excess returns on factors SMB, HML, 
and UMD, respectively, and  is a dummy variable equal to one if the manager is female 
and zero if male.  
We use the Russell 1000 index and the S&P 500 index as a proxy for the market. The 
Russell 1000 is chosen because it is the best-fit index for all domestic equity funds according to 
Morningstar. The S&P 500 is chosen because some of our funds go back as far as March 1984, 
while the Russell 1000 is not available until January 1993. As a much more widely used proxy 
for the market in the literature, we also use the S&P 500 for robustness comparisons. 
SMB (Small Minus Big) is the average return on three small portfolios minus the average 
return on three big portfolios. It encapsulates the idea that small company stocks outperform 
large company stocks over time. HML (High Minus Low) is the average return on two value 
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portfolios minus the average return on two growth portfolios. HML encompasses the assertion 
that value stocks (high book-to-market) outperform growth stocks (low book-to-market) over 
time. UMD (Up Minus Down) is the momentum factor, defined as the average return on the two 
high prior return portfolios minus the average return on the two low prior return portfolios from 
six value-weighted portfolios formed on size and prior returns.9 
 
Pooled-OLS regression results are obtained for all three models using the full sample of 
2,217 funds. The focus is on the dummy variable, . If the coefficient of the gender 
dummy is insignificant, it indicates that there is no evidence of the difference in fund 
performance due to gender. However, if the dummy is positive and significant, the hypothesis is 
rejected. This result will imply that female managers produce better returns than male managers.  
We take our analysis one step further. Within a given fund, we examine whether there is 
any performance change due to the gender composition change in the management using the 
changing composition sub-sample. The one-index model and two multi-factor models along with 
a new dummy variable are used. Specifically,  
                                                                                               (4) 
                                                          (5) 
                                      (6) 
where is equal to one when there is a higher percentage of female managers between 
the two periods, and zero denotes a relatively higher percentage of male managers between the 
two periods. We are directly comparing two time periods within the management of a single 
                                                 
9 The UMD factor and the Fama-French factors are available to the public from Kenneth French’s web site at 
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html  
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mutual fund. As shown in the following diagram, in order to allow new management to be fully 
in control of the fund’s assets (and therefore, return), we skip a six-month window right after 
every change in the gender composition in the management. We use both 12- and 24-month 
periods for robustness and to be sure that we are using enough data.  
 
A panel regression is run on the three models to determine if the change in gender is 
significant. The changing composition sub-sample is used here. We further separate the sample 
into male-to-female changes and the female-to-male changes in management composition. Since 
in all cases, the change dummy is equal to one for an increase in female management, a positive 
and significant result for this dummy will indicate that female management outperforms male 
management over time within a fund. 
Finally, we analyze changes in manager gender uses the actual percentage of female 
managers for each month of the fund’s existence, or as far back as March 1984, whichever is 
less. The models used are as follows: 
  
Old Management Period New Management Period 
12- or 24-month 
tested period 
12- or 24-month 
tested period 
6-month window 
(not tested) 
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                                                                                               (7) 
                                                           (8) 
                                       (9) 
where is equal to the percentage of female managers managing the fund in any given 
month t. If the coefficient for is positive and significant, then the percentage of female 
management is positively related to the performance of the fund over time. 
 
V. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
A description of female domestic equity mutual fund managers relative to total funds in 
our sample is illustrated in Table 1. All funds are separated into four categories: value, blend, 
growth and other. Panel A shows that female managers comprise about 10.5% of the selected 
domestic equity mutual fund managers. Additionally, among the four fund categories females are 
slightly over-represented in the blend category and under-represented in the value category: 
almost 12% of blend managers are female, while only a little over 9% of value managers are 
female. 
Panel B of Table 1 compares the percentage allocation of selected female fund managers 
in the four categories to the percentage of the overall sample. The number and percentage of 
female managers in value funds is lowest. Also, 29% of female mangers run blend funds. This is 
somewhat higher than the proportion of blend fund managers to the overall sample (26%). The 
proportions of female managers in growth and other categories are almost identical to the 
proportion of female managers to total funds. These two panels taken together suggest that there 
is a tendency for females to manage blend funds and not to manage value funds. 
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Comparisons of 10 fund characteristics between male and female fund managers related 
to hypothesis one are presented in Tables 2, 3 and 4. The funds were separated into the value, 
blend, growth, and other style categories. 
The comparison results for the size-tenure matched sample are shown in Table 2.The 
results indicate that female value fund managers have a higher turnover ratio and a higher 
propensity to manage a no-load fund. The higher turnover is contrary to the finding that females 
in the general population tend to trade less. Female blend fund managers tend to have a slightly 
higher P/E ratio than matched males. Female growth fund managers have a lower propensity to 
manage a no-load fund. And, female managers managing the other funds invest significantly less 
assets in their top ten holdings. Comparisons between male and female managers across all four 
categories show that male fund managers have a higher standard deviation in returns and tend to 
concentrate their assets more in their top ten holdings suggesting they may be less diversified 
than female managers. Additionally, male managers have a significantly higher turnover ratio. 
Table 3 reveals the comparison results using the standard-deviation-tenure sub-sample. 
For the value funds, the gender difference on turnover disappears but female managers are still 
more likely to manage a no-load fund then male ones. Moreover, there is a significant difference 
in the total number of holdings, which implies that female value fund managers under the current 
match hold more stocks than male managers. The results also show that female managers in the 
blend, growth and other categories hold less assets in their top 10 holdings. Furthermore, female 
blend fund managers have a higher turnover ratio, female growth fund managers have a higher 
P/E ratio, and, females in the “other” category hold more stocks than their male counterparts. 
When we look at comparisons across all four categories, evidence shows that females hold more 
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stocks, have a lower concentration in their top 10 holdings and a higher P/E ratio than male 
managers. 
The results of gender comparisons among the holding-tenure match sub-sample are 
presented in Table 4. The gender differences of the fund characteristics in value funds are 
consistent with the standard-deviation-tenure matched sample: females hold more stocks and are 
more likely to manage a no-load fund than males. There are no significant differences between 
male and female blend fund managers. In the growth category, males are more likely than 
females to manage a no-load fund, which is same as shown in size-tenure sub-sample. In the 
“other” category, female managers have somewhat lower standard deviation in the fund returns. 
When look at the gender differences for all categories combined, female managers have slightly 
lower standard deviations in returns and trade much less than male managers. 
Hypothesis one is rejected because we do observe certain gender difference in fund 
characteristics within styles of mutual funds. However, when reviewing and analyzing Tables 2, 
3, and 4 together, it is difficult to draw an unambiguous conclusion based upon the paired t-test 
results. The gender differences in fund characteristics often tend not to retain among all three 
sub-samples with different matching criteria. The most robust result in all three sub-samples is 
that females are more likely to manage a no-load fund in the value category than are males. Also, 
the following gender differences are shown in any two out of three matched samples: standard 
deviation is significant in both tables that are not matched by standard deviation. Female 
managers typically achieve less standard deviation in returns, have a significantly lower 
percentage of assets in their top 10 holdings, and have more holdings than males. Each of these 
findings seems to be consistent with the findings in the general public (see Barber and Odean 
(2001) among others) that females have a lower risk tolerance, which means that female 
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managers try to spread their risk out over many stocks and hold few assets in their top 10 
holdings. Finally, it is worth pointing out that net assets and expense ratio are never significantly 
different between the genders in all sub-samples. 
The remaining discussion of the empirical results is focused on the fund performance 
differences due to managers’ gender. We analyze panel data of managers currently in control of 
all 2,217 funds using equations (1) to (3). The results presented in Table 5 show that the gender 
dummy is not statistically significant in all three models. This implies that under current 
management, fund manager’s gender does not affect fund performance. Additionally, one-index 
and three-factor models show that mutual funds outperform the market regardless under male or 
female managers. However, after considering the momentum factor, the significant positive 
abnormal returns disappear. 
Now, we turn our analysis to gender differences in performance when there is a major 
change in the gender of fund management within a single mutual fund. We apply the changing 
composition sub-sample to equations (4) to (6).  We analyze the concluding 12-month period for 
previous management, skip a six-month window so that new management can adjust the fund’s 
portfolio according to its preferred method of investing, and analyze the following 12-month 
period for new management.10 The results of pooled regressions are shown in Table 6.11 Panel A 
displays the results from all 129 changes in management gender. The coefficients of dummy 
variable for changing composition in management are negative but insignificant in all equations. 
The abnormal return (alpha) is not significant in the single index equations, but it is in the multi-
factor equations. We further explore the assumption that the direction of changes in the 
                                                 
10 To run a robustness check, the same analysis was conducted using 24-month testing period. There are no 
fundamental changes in the results. Therefore, they are not presented in the paper.  
11 We perform SBIC test for pooled and fixed effects. All of the SBIC results favor using the pooled regression. 
Further, none of the fixed-effects results were materially different from the pooled regressions. 
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management gender composition may affect the fund performance. Panel B shows the results of 
a change from a lower percentage of female managers to a higher percentage of female managers 
(i.e. male-to-female). The coefficients of dummy for changing composition are now positive but 
again insignificant. The abnormal returns are negative and significant in all equations. In Panel 
C, changes in management gender from a higher percentage of female mangers to a lower 
percentage of female managers (i.e. female-to-male) are shown. The coefficients of dummy for 
change are now significant and negative in all equations while the abnormal returns are no longer 
significant. In short, hypothesis two is rejected under certain conditions. It appears that abnormal 
returns are significant only when management changes from a lower percentage to a higher 
percentage of female managers, suggesting that, in this case, all managers have significantly 
negative returns and there is no significant difference in the gender of the manager. However, 
when management changes from a higher percentage to a lower percentage of female managers, 
the gender of the manager is significant. The results show that fund returns become better after 
new management with lower percentage of females is in place. 
Finally, we examine the impact of gender composition change in management through 
the percentage of female manager in a given fund using the same changing composition sub-
sample. Rather than looking only at the manager tenures immediately before and after a major 
change in manager gender composition, we assign a percentage of female managers to each 
month of a fund’s existence or as far back as 20 years (March 1984), whichever is less. As an 
example, this number is equal to 1 if the only managers of a fund are female or 0.25 if there are 
four managers of a particular fund and one of them is female. The variable, Femalein equations 
(7) to (9), picks up changes in gender composition of fund management regardless whether it is a 
major or minor change.  
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The results of pooled regressions are shown in Table 7. The coefficient of Female is 
negative but insignificant in the single-index models. However, it becomes negative and 
significant in the multi-factor models. The multi-factor models may be better since they 
consistently have higher adjusted R-squareds, indicating that these models can explain a higher 
percentage of the excess returns in the funds. So, the regression results suggest that the 
percentage of female managers of a particular fund is inversely related to its performance.  
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Literature in recent years suggests that females are more conservative investors than 
males. But fund managers typically have more investment education than the average person. So, 
the question of whether or not female fund managers exhibit more conservative tendencies is an 
interesting one. Along with this question, we explore whether or not the investment decisions of 
female fund managers affect the performance of the funds that they manage in a different way 
than do the investment decisions of male managers. 
We find a few differences in the matched comparison that suggest that female managers 
have a lower risk tolerance. They tend to spread their risk out over many stocks and hold few 
assets in their top 10 holdings. Also, females managing value funds manage no-load funds 
significantly more than males. 
When examining current managers for all 2,217 domestic equity funds, we find that there 
are no significant differences in performance of mutual funds due to management gender. This is 
consistent with Atkinson et al. (2003) where they examine fixed-income funds.  
We then analyze performance within funds over time in order to examine the impact of 
changes in management’s gender composition on the fund performance. When considering all 
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funds with major gender composition changes, there is no evidence shown that the composition 
changes lead to a corresponding performance change. However, after we break down the issue, it 
is rather clear that the performance improves after a reduction in the percentage of female 
management in a given fund. We also find that using the multi-factor models the percentage of 
female managers in a fund is negatively related to the fund’s performance over time. 
Finally, even though we show evidence here that an inverse relationship exists between 
the percentage of female managers in a fund and its performance, there are three reasons why 
one should be cautioned in interpreting and applying our empirical results. First, although 
significant, the absolute value of the differences between funds with male managers and funds 
with female managers is small. So, an investor may not benefit simply by seeking a male mutual 
fund manager. Second, the results should not be blindly applied to any individual fund manager. 
Many female managers outperform male managers. Third, all of our results are based upon 
historical data. If mutual fund managers’ abilities have evolved over the last twenty years, results 
may be different for today’s managers. 
  
 Page 21 
 
REFERENCES 
Atkinson, Stanley M., Samantha Boyce Baird, and Melissa B. Frye, “Do Female Mutual Fund 
Managers Manage Differently?,” The Journal of Financial Research, 2003, pp. 1–18. 
 
Bajtelsmit, Vickie L. and Jack. L. VanDerhei, “Risk Aversion and Pension Investment Choices,” 
in Michael S. Gordon, Olivia S. Mitchell, and Marc M. Twinney, eds., Positioning 
Pensions for the Twenty-First Century, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 
1997, pp. 45 – 66 
 
Barber, Brad M. and Terrance Odean, “Boys Will Be Boys: Gender, Overconfidence, and 
Common Stock Investment,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2001, pp. 261 – 292. 
 
Barber, Brad M. and Terrance Odean, “Trading is Hazardous to Your Wealth: The Common 
Stock Investment Performance of Individual Investors,” The Journal of Finance, 2000, 
vol. 55, no. 2, pp. 773 – 806. 
 
Barberis, Nicholas and Andrei Shleifer, “Style Investing,” Journal of Financial Economics, 
2003, vol. 68, pp. 161 – 199. 
 
Beckmann, Daniela and Lukas Menkhoff, “Will women be women? Analyzing the gender 
difference among financial experts,” KYKLOS, 2008, vol. 61, no. 3, pp. 364–384. 
 
Carhart, Mark M., “On Persistence in Mutual Fund Performance,” The Journal of Finance, 1997, 
vol. 52, no. 1, pp. 57 – 82. 
 
Chevalier, Judith and Glenn Ellison, “Are Some Mutual Fund Managers Better Than Others? 
Cross-Sectional Patterns in Behavior and Performance,” The Journal of Finance, June 
1999, pp. 875 – 899. 
 
Estes, R. and J. Hosseini, “The Gender Gap on Wall Street: An Empirical Analysis of 
Confidence in Investment Decision Making,” Journal of Psychology, 1988, pp. 577 – 
590. 
 
Golec, Joseph H., “The Effects of Mutual Fund Managers’ Characteristics on Their Portfolio 
Performance, Risk and Fees,” Financial Services Review, 1996, vol. 5, no. 2, pp. 133 – 
148. 
 
Gottesman, Aron A. and Matthew R. Morey, “Manager Education and Mutual Fund 
Performance,” Journal of Empirical Finance, 2006, vol. 13, no. 2, pp. 145 – 182. 
 
Lakonishok, Josef, Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny, “Contrarian Investment, 
Extrapolation, and Risk,” The Journal of Finance, 1994, vol. 49. no. 5, pp. 1541 – 1578. 
 
 Page 22 
 
Powell, Melanie and David Ansic, “Gender Differences in Risk Behaviour in Financial Decision-
Making: An Experimental Analysis,” Journal of Economic Psychology, 1997, pp. 605 – 
628. 
 
Schubert, Renate, Martin Brown, Matthias Gysler, and Hans Wolfgang Brachinger, “Financial 
Decision-Making: Are Women Really More Risk-Averse?,” American Economic Review, 
1999, pp. 381 – 385. 
 
Sundén, Annika E. and Brian J. Surette, “Gender Differences in The Allocation of Assets in 
Retirement Savings Plans,” American Economic Review, 1998, pp. 207 – 211. 
 
 
 Page 23 
 
TABLE 1. Female Domestic Equity Mutual Fund Managers 
 
Panel A. Female Managers as a Percentage of Funds by Category 
Category # of Female Managers Total Funds Percentage  
Value 35 373 9.38%  
Blend 68 576 11.81%  
Growth 75 732 10.25%  
Other 55 536 10.26%  
Total 233 2,217 10.51%  
     
Panel B. Female Managers by Category as a Percentage of All Female Managers  
    and Total Funds by Category as a Percentage of All Funds 
Category # of Female Managers Percentage Total Funds Percentage 
Value 35 15.02% 373 16.82% 
Blend 68 29.18% 576 25.98% 
Growth 75 32.19% 732 33.02% 
Other 55 23.61% 536 24.18% 
Total 233 100.00% 2,217 100.00% 
 
Note: This table illustrates the relative proportion of domestic equity fund managers that are 
female. Only funds actively managed primarily by a single male or female manager were 
considered when compiling this table. All data was obtained from the Morningstar Principia 
Advanced Mutual Funds Module dated February 29, 2004. 
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TABLE 2. Male and Female Mutual Fund Manager Comparison of Means (Matched by Net Assets and Tenure) 
 
Category 
(Observations)  
Expense 
Ratio 
Standard 
Deviation 
Total Number 
of Holdings 
% Assets in Top 
10 Holdings P/E Ratio 
Turnover 
Ratio No-load 
Net 
Assets 
Tenure 
(Days) 
Value (35 pairs)           
 Male  1.268 17.549 107.9 26.269 16.091 53.914 0.457 1959.89 1461 
 Female  1.142 17.938 125.3 29.344 16.166 71.829 0.800 2028.78 1477 
 p-value  0.205 0.575 0.486 0.124 0.861 0.050** 0.003*** 0.430 0.873 
Blend (68 pairs)           
 Male  1.212 18.452 277.5 26.457 18.193 87.851 0.588 529.72 1497 
 Female  1.159 18.240 254.0 24.515 18.803 78.235 0.691 532.08 1496 
 p-value  0.544 0.702 0.804 0.407 0.096* 0.440 0.211 0.821 0.997 
Growth (75 pairs)           
 Male  1.399 22.027 99.0 25.665 23.597 128.797 0.640 501.17 1341 
 Female  1.380 20.877 111.9 23.844 24.613 112.160 0.480 490.37 1378 
 p-value  0.775 0.108 0.391 0.193 0.165 0.263 0.045** 0.437 0.567 
Other Funds (55 pairs)          
 Male  1.496 19.012 197.5 40.577 22.113 193.891 0.418 437.11 1312 
 Female  1.400 16.339 272.8 29.828 20.351 114.145 0.545 382.37 1240 
 p-value  0.398 0.220 0.146 0.006*** 0.311 0.135 0.164 0.470 0.159 
All Funds (233 pairs)           
 Male  1.348 19.599 176.4 29.507 20.519 121.074 0.545 713.500 1398 
 Female  1.286 18.595 193.1 26.279 20.653 96.670 0.605 708.140 1395 
 p-value  0.160 0.089* 0.479 0.011** 0.794 0.086* 0.151 0.813 0.931 
Note: This table shows a comparison of means and p-values (to report the significance of the difference between the two paired 
sample means) for several important variables that are related to a fund’s investment objective or to its management style. In each 
category, a portfolio of fund returns is averaged and the means are compared with those of the opposite gender. The number in 
parentheses next to each category name is the number of distinct female fund managers that exist in that category. These were 
matched by total assets and tenure to the list of funds managed by male managers, and the closest matches were selected for the male 
portfolio. All data was obtained from the Morningstar Principia Advanced Mutual Funds Module dated February 29, 2004. 
* Significant at the 10% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, *** Significant at the 1% level. 
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TABLE 3. Male and Female Mutual Fund Manager Comparison of Means (Matched by Standard Deviation and Tenure) 
 
Category 
(Observations)  
Expense 
Ratio 
Standard 
Deviation 
Total Number 
of Holdings 
% Assets in Top 
10 Holdings P/E Ratio 
Turnover 
Ratio No-load 
Net 
Assets 
Tenure 
(Days) 
Value (35 pairs)           
 Male  1.261 18.177 86.3 30.474 16.803 59.743 0.629 1490.847 1393 
 Female  1.142 17.938 125.3 29.344 16.166 71.829 0.800 2028.775 1477 
 p-value  0.205 0.237 0.057* 0.740 0.479 0.219 0.057* 0.748 0.291 
Blend (68 pairs)           
 Male  1.155 18.199 166.2 34.240 18.494 57.358 0.647 676.981 1451 
 Female  1.159 18.240 254.0 24.515 18.803 78.235 0.691 532.081 1497 
 p-value  0.867 0.460 0.122 0.005*** 0.447 0.044** 0.568 0.463 0.326 
Growth (75 pairs)           
 Male  1.458 20.818 95.4 29.011 23.266 125.360 0.613 328.468 1337 
 Female  1.380 20.877 111.9 23.844 24.613 112.160 0.480 490.370 1379 
 p-value  0.356 0.333 0.408 0.004*** 0.045** 0.317 0.105 0.291 0.383 
Other Funds (55 pairs)          
 Male  1.377 16.299 159.9 39.346 19.364 143.800 0.473 1039.182 1223 
 Female  1.400 16.339 272.8 29.828 20.351 114.145 0.545 382.367 1240 
 p-value  0.819 0.564 0.077* 0.019** 0.407 0.456 0.455 0.248 0.680 
All Funds (233 pairs)           
 Male  1.320 18.590 130.4 33.197 19.942 100.194 0.592 772.551 1362 
 Female  1.286 18.595 193.1 26.279 20.653 96.670 0.605 708.140 1395 
 p-value  0.376 0.913 0.007*** 0.000*** 0.082* 0.747 0.768 0.825 0.220 
Note: This table shows a comparison of means and p-values (to report the significance of the difference between the two paired 
sample means) for several important variables that are related to a fund’s investment objective or to its management style. In each 
category, a portfolio of fund returns is averaged and the means are compared with those of the opposite gender. The number in 
parentheses next to each category name is the number of distinct female fund managers that exist in that category. These were 
matched by total assets and tenure to the list of funds managed by male managers, and the closest matches were selected for the male 
portfolio. All data was obtained from the Morningstar Principia Advanced Mutual Funds Module dated February 29, 2004. 
* Significant at the 10% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, *** Significant at the 1% level. 
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TABLE 4. Male and Female Mutual Fund Manager Comparison of Means (Matched by % Assets in Top 10 Holdings and 
Tenure) 
 
Category 
(Observations)  
Expense 
Ratio 
Standard 
Deviation 
Total Number 
of Holdings 
% Assets in Top 
10 Holdings P/E Ratio 
Turnover 
Ratio No-load 
Net 
Assets 
Tenure 
(Days) 
Value (35 pairs)           
 Male  1.293 18.208 94.743 29.318 15.863 103.735 0.514 379.711 1355 
 Female  1.142 17.938 125.257 29.344 16.166 71.829 0.800 2028.775 1477 
 p-value  0.170 0.733 0.056* 0.961 0.516 0.268 0.010*** 0.307 0.175 
Blend (68 pairs)           
 Male  1.135 18.530 278.926 24.770 18.902 62.897 0.647 775.361 1456 
 Female  1.159 18.240 254.000 24.515 18.803 78.235 0.691 532.081 1497 
 p-value  0.770 0.478 0.486 0.192 0.877 0.106 0.594 0.460 0.284 
Growth (75 pairs)           
 Male  1.327 21.634 122.836 23.860 23.897 190.493 0.627 609.366 1335 
 Female  1.380 20.877 111.907 23.844 24.613 112.160 0.480 490.370 1379 
 p-value  0.517 0.201 0.506 0.777 0.258 0.148 0.078* 0.485 0.176 
Other Funds (55 pairs)          
 Male  1.465 19.711 289.164 30.119 21.318 162.964 0.600 1440.923 1286 
 Female  1.400 16.339 272.818 29.828 20.351 114.145 0.545 382.367 1240 
 p-value  0.567 0.063* 0.795 0.273 0.483 0.309 0.606 0.152 0.284 
All Funds (233 pairs)           
 Male  1.299 19.760 204.130 26.423 20.610 133.853 0.609 819.604 1356 
 Female  1.286 18.595 193.103 26.319 20.653 96.670 0.605 708.140 1395 
 p-value  0.736 0.019** 0.587 0.228 0.962 0.083* 0.927 0.724 0.174 
Note: This table shows a comparison of means and p-values (to report the significance of the difference between the two paired 
sample means) for several important variables that are related to a fund’s investment objective or to its management style. In each 
category, a portfolio of fund returns is averaged and the means are compared with those of the opposite gender. The number in 
parentheses next to each category name is the number of distinct female fund managers that exist in that category. These were 
matched by total assets and tenure to the list of funds managed by male managers, and the closest matches were selected for the male 
portfolio. All data was obtained from the Morningstar Principia Advanced Mutual Funds Module dated February 29, 2004. 
* Significant at the 10% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, *** Significant at the 1% level. 
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TABLE 5. Gender Significance in Current Mutual Fund Managers 
 
 One-index Regression  3-Factor Regression  4-Factor Regression 
 Russell 1000  S&P 500     
 Factor Est. Coeff  Factor Est. Coeff  Factor Est. Coeff  Factor Est. Coeff 
 ALPHA 0.2237 ***  ALPHA 0.23787 ***  ALPHA 0.01686 **  ALPHA -0.03821 *** 
  0.009    0.00782    0.01686    0.00788  
 GENDER -0.03632   GENDER -0.01896   GENDER -0.01665   GENDER -0.01673  
  0.02745    0.02382    0.02217    0.02215  
 Russell 1000 0.91665 ***  S&P 500 0.9 ***  RMRF 0.89059 ***  RMRF 0.90847 *** 
  0.00182    0.00159    0.00151    0.00177  
        SMB 0.16464 ***  SMB 0.17518 *** 
          0.002    0.00207  
        HML 0.00734 ***  HML 0.04316 *** 
          0.00169    0.0025  
           UMD 0.03606 *** 
              0.00185  
             
Adjusted R-squared 0.54101    0.54581    0.60688    0.60743  
 
 
Pooled regressions were performed on returns from all 2,217 current domestic equity managers using the equations: 
tppptpptp GenderIr ,, εγβα +++=  and tppp
J
i
tiipptp GenderIr ,
1
,,, εγβα +++= ∑
=
, where GENDER is a dummy equal to 1 if the 
current manager is female for all returns in months of the current manager's tenure and 0 if the current manager is male. Standard errors are below 
coefficients.   * Significant at the 10% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; *** Significant at the 1% level. 
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TABLE 6. Dynamic Change in Manager Gender (12-Months Before and After) 
PANEL A: All Major Changes in Management Gender 
 RUSSELL 1000 S&P 500 Fama-French 3 Factors Carhart 4 Factors 
 Factor Est. Coeff. Factor Est. Coeff. Factor Est. Coeff. Factor Est. Coeff. 
 Alpha -0.12753  Alpha -0.14402  Alpha -0.27145 *** Alpha -0.36572 *** 
  0.09292   0.09019   0.08177   0.08523  
 CHANGE12 -0.0223  CHANGE12 -0.02134  CHANGE12 -0.0693  CHANGE12 -0.06616  
  0.13151   0.12729   0.11503   0.11478  
 RUS1000EX 0.91612 *** SP500EX 0.89566 *** RMRF 0.87405 *** RMRF 0.90678 *** 
  0.01377   0.01361   0.01279   0.01537  
       SMB 0.12788 *** SMB 0.14829 *** 
        0.01536   0.01623  
       HML -0.02893 ** HML 0.03161  
        0.01288   0.02038  
          UMD 0.05714 *** 
           0.01493  
             
Adjusted R-squared 0.6105   0.5830   0.6596   0.6611  
Fixed-Effects F-Test 1.2141   1.1858   1.3023   1.3151  
Fixed-Effects P-Value 0.0587   0.0794   0.0141   0.0114  
SBIC - Pooled OLS 7547.5   8318.5   8011.2   8007.9  
SBIC - Fixed Effects 7956.8   8755.7   8440.9   8436.8  
No. Observations 123   129   129   129  
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TABLE 6. Dynamic Change in Manager Gender (12-Months Before and After) (continued) 
PANEL B: Major Changes in Management Gender from Male-to-Female 
 RUSSELL 1000 S&P 500 Fama-French 3 Factors Carhart 4 Factors 
 Factor Est. Coeff. Factor Est. Coeff. Factor Est. Coeff. Factor Est. Coeff. 
 Alpha -0.31054 ** Alpha -0.3141 *** Alpha -0.41988 *** Alpha -0.52682 *** 
  0.12242   0.11742   0.10699   0.11065  
 CHANGE12 0.26951  CHANGE12 0.25741  CHANGE12 0.16981  CHANGE12 0.16363  
  0.17116   0.16545   0.15067   0.1502  
 RUS1000EX 0.92518 *** SP500EX 0.91417 *** RMRF 0.89463 *** RMRF 0.93688 *** 
  0.01766   0.01749   0.01642   0.02009  
       SMB 0.13868 *** SMB 0.16479 *** 
        0.01983   0.02104  
       HML -0.0067793  HML 0.06944 *** 
        -0.40821   0.02674  
          UMD 0.07122 *** 
           0.01963  
             
Adjusted R-squared 0.6128   0.5904   0.6610   0.6632  
Fixed-Effects F-Test 1.3015   1.3430   1.4266   1.4293  
Fixed-Effects P-Value 0.0462   0.0264   0.0095   0.0092  
SBIC - Pooled OLS 4671.6   5127.5   4954.7   4951.9  
SBIC - Fixed Effects 4898.6   5368.7   5192.6   5189.6  
No. Observations 75    79   79   79  
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TABLE 6. Dynamic Change in Manager Gender (12-Months Before and After) (continued) 
PANEL C: Major Changes in Management Gender from Female-to-Male 
 RUSSELL 1000 S&P 500 Fama-French 3 Factors Carhart 4 Factors 
 Factor Est. Coeff. Factor Est. Coeff. Factor Est. Coeff. Factor Est. Coeff. 
 Alpha 0.13969  Alpha 0.10593  Alpha -0.01952  Alpha -0.08809  
  0.14197   0.14046   0.12642   0.13349  
 CHANGE12 -0.46752 ** CHANGE12 -0.42732 ** CHANGE12 -0.4696 *** CHANGE12 -0.45889 *** 
  0.20572   0.19943   0.17858   0.17859  
 RUS1000EX 0.90713 *** SP500EX 0.87095 *** RMRF 0.83969 *** RMRF 0.8591 *** 
  0.02205   0.02174   0.0204   0.02376  
       SMB 0.09927 *** SMB 0.11173 *** 
        0.0243   0.02551  
       HML -0.07438 *** HML -0.03653  
        0.0204   0.03133  
          UMD 0.03635  
           0.02285  
             
Adjusted R-squared 0.6087   0.5724   0.6605   0.6609  
Fixed-Effects F-Test 1.0772   0.9435   1.0536   1.0716  
Fixed-Effects P-Value 0.3371   0.5855   0.3753   0.3440  
SBIC - Pooled OLS 2879.6   3194.5   3062.2   3064.5  
SBIC - Fixed Effects 3018   3344.6   3209.5   3211.3  
No. Observations 48   50   50   50  
 
Panel regressions are performed on 129 instances of a change in the gender of a manager either from male-to-female (79) or female-to-male (50) among 102 
funds using equations tptpptpptp ChangeIr ,,, 12 εγβα +++=  and tptpp
J
i
tiipptp ChangeIr ,,
1
,,, 12 εγβα +++= ∑
=
. Only time periods that are identifiable as 
changes in gender where the prior-manager and the post-manager were in control of the fund for at least 12 and 18 consecutive months, respectively are 
considered (so that there is a 6-month window between analyses). CHANGE12 = 1 for the manager period with a higher female concentration whether or not 
this tenure preceded or was immediately following the period with a lower female concentration. Only changes to or from a concentration of female managers 
of 50% or more are considered. Panel A shows all major gender changes, while Panel B shows only male-to-female changes and Panel C shows only female-
to-male changes. Standard errors are below the coefficients.  * Significant at the 10% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; *** Significant at the 1% level. 
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TABLE 7. Percentage Change in Management Gender Composition 
 Russell 1000 SP500 Fama-French 3 Factors Carhart 4 Factors 
 Factor Est. Coeff. Factor Est. Coeff. Factor Est. Coeff. Factor Est. Coeff. 
 Alpha 0.19785 *** Alpha 0.24161 *** Alpha 0.05921 * Alpha -0.00714  
  0.04175   0.03381   0.03062   0.03195  
 FEMALE -0.07954  FEMALE -0.09087  FEMALE -0.12715 ** FEMALE -0.13198 ** 
  0.07148   0.06101   0.05499   0.05490  
 RUS1000 0.90926 *** SP500 0.89482 *** RMRF 0.88380 *** RMRF 0.90442 ***
  0.00679   0.00577   0.00535   0.00607  
       SMB 0.16983 *** SMB 0.18356 ***
        0.00717   0.00741  
       HML -0.02276 *** HML 0.02238 ** 
        0.00617   0.00881  
          UMD 0.04696 ***
           0.00656  
             
Adjusted R-squared 0.6012   0.6035   0.6785   0.6795  
Fixed Effects F-Test 0.7271   0.8469   0.9874   0.9880  
Fixed Effects P-Value 0.9819   0.8640   0.5173   0.5155  
 
Panel regressions were performed using all cases where there was at one time (since March 1984) a major change in management gender 
composition, either from female to male or male to female. The following equations were tested: tptpptpptp FemaleIr ,,, εγβα +++=  and 
tptpp
J
i
tiipptp FemaleIr ,,
1
,,, εγβα +++= ∑
=
, where Female is equal to the percentage of female managers managing a fund for a given month. All 
months of the fund for which data is available are included. So, the following must hold for all months: 0 <= Female <= 1. A major change is defined 
as at least 50% of the managers of a fund at a specific time must be female (male) and change to at least 50% male (female). The same manager 
composition must remain in control of the fund for at least 12 months both before and after the date of change in gender composition. This resulted 
in a sample of 102 funds with a total of 150 gender composition changes. Standard errors are below coefficients. * Significant at the 10% level; ** 
Significant at the 5% level; *** Significant at the 1% level. 
 
